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Abstract 
 
The business case for corporate environmental responsibility is the claim that behaving 
responsibly makes financial sense.  It is impossible to exaggerate the contemporary 
significance of this claim, not least in legitimising environmental concerns in the 
corporate sphere.  However, the business case is not without significant empirical and 
normative limitations, as is illustrated by the corporate environmental problem of 
supermarket waste.  This paper evaluates Enlightened Shareholder Value under section 
172 of the Companies Act 2006 in light of such   business case limitations. It suggests 
that section 172, by procedurally mandating the business case for corporate 
environmental responsibility, is a retrograde step which envisions not enlightened, but 
rather environmentally unenlightened, shareholders. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper, I consider the limitations of the business case for Corporate 
Environmental Responsibility (CER) and the implications of this for corporate law.  
The business case is the claim that behaving responsibly makes financial sense; that 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) pays.  Whether this claim is more than mere 
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assertion, however, is disputed.  Despite a large body of empirical research on the topic, 
no consensus emerges as to the existence of a generalised link between CSR and 
corporate financial performance.  In this paper, I present two objections to the business 
case which run deeper than these empirical uncertainties.   
 The first objection relates to the rhetoric of the business case claim, which 
suggests that win-win situations exist as a matter of course.  The ready or easy 
compatibility of environmental and economic concerns is taken as a starting point, and 
this starting point is problematic. Regardless of the generalised claim, trade-offs and 
points of conflict between environmental and economic goals do and will continue to 
exist.  Furthermore, many of these trade-offs are deeply embedded in business practice 
and societal interactions, the reversal of which would require significant behavioural 
change.  With this in mind, I suggest that the rhetoric of the business case sends a 
misleading and unhelpful message regarding the effort required to ensure environmental 
protection.  
The second objection relates to the value afforded to CER investments in the 
business case.  Ultimately, environmental protection is commodified, so that its value is 
expressed only in terms of profits, and advocated indirectly by the demands of market 
actors (primarily consumers and investors).  However, it is notoriously complicated and 
controversial to express environmental value in monetary terms, and any inherent or 
intrinsic value there might be in CER is practically irrelevant.  So while the business 
case for CER potentially legitimises environmental protection as a business concern, it 
comes at the cost of sacrificing real environmental value.  Furthermore, as will be 
familiar to environmental lawyers, there are limitations to market interactions in 
bringing about meaningful environmental change. 
 A more normative consideration of the business case is particularly important in 
view of Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV), legally instituted in the UK by section 
172(1) of the Companies Act 2006, which embeds the business case as a mandatory, 
procedural corporate law norm. However, when considering these deeper objections to 
the business case, I suggest that mandatory Enlightened Shareholder Value is a legal 
development we might have been better off without.  And indeed, the problems 
associated with the business case suggest that, far from being enlightened, the 
shareholder envisioned under section 172 is unenlightened. 
 This paper begins, in Part 1, by explaining the significance of the business case 
claim; the empirical evidence thereof; and the reasons why companies may fail to divert 
resources towards win-win investments.  Part 2 explores the two deeper objections to 
the business case.  In order to provide some brief illustration of the issues explored, 
Parts 1 and 2 make use of examples from the corporate environmental problem of food 
and packaging waste in the retail grocer sector.  Part 3 evaluates ESV in light of 
objections to the business case for CER. 
 
 
1. The business case for corporate environmental responsibility 
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The importance of the business case claim 
 While there is no strong definitional consensus,1 CSR is often understood as 
involving activities which stretch beyond shareholders to consider stakeholder-type 
interests, as well as going beyond externally imposed legal requirements which protect 
those stakeholder concerns.2  At the heart of CSR debates is this tension between 
shareholders and stakeholders: for whom should corporations be run?  One need not 
look very far in CSR scholarship or textbooks before finding Milton Friedman’s famous 
New York Times article, declaring that the only social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits for shareholders.3  This version of ‘shareholder primacy’ is often 
interpreted to render CSR illegitimate.  A consideration of stakeholder interests is in 
direct contradiction to the requirement to remain singularly focussed on the interests of 
shareholders.  In the extreme, CSR expenditures on, for example, reducing pollution 
beyond what is required by environmental law, are presented as little more than theft 
from shareholders as owners of the company: such investments involve ‘spending 
someone else’s money for a general social interest.’4  While expression of the legal 
issues in such terms involves oversimplification, this characterisation nonetheless 
frames much CSR literature.5  And of course, this tension persists in a heated body of 
corporate law scholarship dating back (at least) 80 years as to the appropriate corporate 
purpose; should companies be concerned only with the pursuit of profit or, alternatively, 
should corporations be subject to broader societal obligations?6 
                                                
1 See, for example, A McWilliams, D Siegel and PM Wright ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic 
Implications’ (2006) 43(1) Journal of Management Studies 1. Indeed, the definitions are numerous; AB Carroll 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct’ (1999) 38(3) Business & Society 268 
identified 25 different ways of defining CSR (see D Melé ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Theories’ in A Crane, A 
McWilliams, D Matten, J Moon and DS Siegel (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)).  For an argument that CSR is a useless term with little explanatory value, 
see JH van Oosterhout and PPMAR Heugens ‘Much Ado About Nothing: A Conceptual Critique of Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ in Crane et al, above n 1.  
2 See, for example, K Davis ‘The Case for and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities’ (1973) 16(2) 
The Academy of Management Journal 312 p 313, describing CSR as beginning ‘where the law ends’ and N 
Gunningham ‘Shaping Corporate Environmental Performance: A Review’ (2009) 19 Environmental Governance and 
Policy 215 p 215.  For a multifaceted appreciation of the relationship between CSR and law, see D McBarnet 
‘Corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: the new corporate accountability’ in D McBarnet, 
A Voiculescu and T Campbell (eds) The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
3 M Friedman ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ The New York Times Magazine (New 
York: 13 September 1970). 
4 Friedman, above n 3. 
5 See, for example, M Blowfield and A Murray Corporate Responsibility: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) p 211, referring to shareholders as owners of the company (which is also the presumption 
underpinning Friedman’s argument).  Of course, shareholders do not own the corporation or its assets (P Ireland 
‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62(1) MLR 32; Short v Treasury Commissioners 
[1948] 1 KB 116).  On oversimplification generally, particularly in view of the wide discretion afforded to directors 
by courts in determining what is in the best interests of the company, see JE Parkinson ‘The Legal Context of 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ (1994) 3(1) Business Ethics: A European Review 16; McBarnet, above n 2, pp 22-3.  
Shareholder primacy is not without positive and normative controversy, and is considered in a little more detail in 
Part 3, below. 
6 The origins are usually traced back to E Merrick Dodd Jr ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 
45(7) Harv L Rev 1145 and AA Berle Jr ‘For Who Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45(8) Harv L 
Rev 1365. 
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 It is against this ongoing debate that the business case for CSR must be 
understood.  Of course, as a justification for CSR, the business case is probably what 
matters for companies: ‘if CSR palpably fails in financial terms, it cannot last.’7   The 
simple rhetoric and language that acting responsibly is good for business also plays an 
important role in legitimising ‘non-business’ issues, including the environment, in the 
eyes of companies themselves, mainstream management theorists and, arguably, even 
Friedman himself.8  Indeed, there now seems no end to the variety of CSR type 
concerns for which business case claims are invoked, including, for example, equality 
and diversity (including the increase of female participation at boardroom level),9 
improved working conditions (particularly in developing countries)10 and respect for 
human rights.11  Fundamentally, however, the business case purports to simply remove 
the tension subsisting at the heart of CSR, in the process sidestepping an almost 
century-old body of corporate governance scholarship.  In ‘business case CSR’, where a 
whole host of societal responsibilities are aligned with the generation of corporate 
profit, the polarity in the debate simply collapses -- shareholders and society no longer 
compete.12 
 
Empirical evidence for the business case 
 The literature on the business case is extensive and a thorough overview is 
beyond the scope of this paper.13  However, two separate meta-analyses provide a useful 
way in to the volume of empirical evidence.14  While both of these studies indicate an 
overall positive correlation between CSR and corporate financial performance (CFP),15 
this empirical evidence for the business case remains uncertain: in short, there is no 
consensus as to whether there exists a generalised positive relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and CFP.16  A comparison of the rather different 
                                                
7 D Henderson Misguided Virtue – False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility (London: The Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 2001) p 128. 
8  D Vogel The Market for Virtue – The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (Washington DC: 
The Brookings Institution, 2006) pp 17-26. 
9 See, for example, M McCann and S Wheeler ‘Gender Diversity in the FTSE 100: The Business Case Claim 
Explored’ (2011) 34(4) J L & Soc 542. 
10 See, for example, Vogel, above n 8, ch 4. 
11 Ibid, ch 6, especially pp 158-9 and references therein. 
12 JD Margolis and JP Walsh People and Profits? The Search for a Link Between a Company’s Social and Financial 
Performance (USA: Psychology Press, 2009) p 5. 
13 See, for example, J Allouche and P Laroche ‘The Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Corporate Financial Performance: A Survey’ in J Allouche (ed) Corporate Social Responsibility (Volume 2) – 
Performances and Stakeholders (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); R Cowe and M Hopkins ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Is there a business case?’ in J Burchell (ed) The Corporate Social Responsibility Reader 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); EC Kurucz, BA Colbert and D Wheeler ‘The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ in Crane et al, above n 1; LE Preston and DP O’Bannon ‘The Corporate Social-Financial 
Performance Relationship: A Typology and Analysis’ (1997) 36(4) Business & Society 419; S Zadek ‘Doing Good 
and Doing Well: Making the Business Case for Corporate Citizenship’ (Report for the Conference Board, New York, 
2000). 
14 M Orlitzky ‘Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: A Research Synthesis’ in Crane et al, above 
n 1 and Margolis and Walsh, above n 12.  See also SB Banerjee ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad 
and the Ugly’ (2008) 34(1) Critical Sociology 51 pp 60-1, relying primarily on these studies. 
15 This is confirmed elsewhere, see, for example, Cowe and Hopkins, above n 13, p 106 and references therein. 
16 See, for example, Allouche and Laroche, above n 13; Cowe and Hopkins, above n 13; Kurucz et al, above n 13; 
Vogel, above n 8. 
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conclusions drawn from these meta-analyses is instructive as to some of the reasons 
why uncertainty persists.  
 Orlitzky is critical of what he sees as continued but paradoxical resistance to 
evidence which challenges the traditional trade-off hypothesis of an assumed conflict 
between business and societal interests.17  Conversely, and not unlike other 
commentators pointing to uncertainty in the empirical evidence,18 Margolis and Walsh 
call for caution in the weight attached to the overall positive correlation between CSR 
and CFP.19  This is particularly in view of the string of methodological criticisms 
levelled against the empirical research.  For example, one problem is a lack of 
uniformity, not least with that of measurement.  Studies in the area employ a seemingly 
infinite host of indicators to measure CSR, including the influence of ethics, values and 
principles on a company’s programmes, or the record on eco-efficiency.20  In a similar 
fashion, Margolis and Walsh encountered 70 different measures of business 
performance.21  These include harder-nosed, traditional accounting measures such as 
shareholder revenue, but also softer aspects of business performance, including 
customer attraction, brand value and risk management.22  The sheer volume of variation 
makes comparison between case studies and surveys difficult, if not impossible.23 
 Orlitzky suggests that environmental performance seems negligibly but 
nonetheless positively related to business performance.24  The most forceful evidence of 
an environmental business case concerns eco-efficiency measures and environmentally 
differentiated (‘green’) products influencing the more intangible, softer aspects of 
business practice.25  However, not only is this relationship very slight in any event, 
there are a number of reasons for scepticism as to the empirical basis for the 
environmental business case.  First, of course, there is the string of methodological 
concerns (outlined above).  Second, establishing causal connections remains 
problematic.26  It has yet to be demonstrated that positive relationships between CER 
and CFP are not a matter of reverse causality, where profitable firms are simply more 
able to afford environmental performance investments.27  Third, there is no agreement 
as to the existence of systemic negative relationships, either that behaving badly is bad 
                                                
17 Orlitzky, above n 14, p 56. 
18 See, for example, the commentators referenced above n 16. 
19 Margolis and Walsh, above n 12, p 13; see also Allouche and Laroche, above n 13; Cowe and Hopkins, above n 13. 
20 Margolis and Walsh, above n 12, p 8, noted that social performance was measured by drawing on 27 different data 
sources covering 11 different domains of corporate practice.  See also Zadek, above n 13; Blowfield and Murray, 
above n 5, p 135. 
21 Margolis and Walsh, above n 12. 
22 S Zadek, J Sabapathy, H Døssing and T Swift ‘Responsible Competitiveness: Corporate Responsibility Clusters in 
Action’ (AcountAbility/The Copenhagen Centre, January 2003). 
23 Margolis and Walsh, above n 12. 
24 Orlitzky, above n 14. 
25 Blowfield and Murray, above n 5, p 140.  There is evidence to suggest that environmental laggards are less likely 
than businesses with a developed environmental mindset to attach significant value to these softer aspects of 
corporate performance, see N Gunningham, RA Kagan and D Thornton Shades of Green: Business, Regulation, and 
Environment (California: Stanford University Press, 2003) ch 5. 
26 Cowe and Hopkins, above n 13. 
27 Vogel, above n 8, p 30; Blowfield and Murray, above n 5, p 145. 
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for business,28 or indeed, that behaving responsibly is bad for business.29  But this does 
not tell us much.  Some suggest the lack of evidence for a negative relationship results 
from a shortage of studies actively researching this hypothesis.30 
 
Understanding business cases - supermarkets and waste 
 The search for a generalised and systematic positive relationship between social 
and financial performance will no doubt continue.  However, there is a growing body of 
scholarship which asserts that this endeavour is by its very nature misguided.31  At a 
basic level, corporate responsibility strategies are no different from other business 
investments, and one would not expect all investments to consistently generate sizeable 
returns.32  Increasingly, it is recognised that win-wins are conditional upon the company 
itself, the nature of the industry and other situational concerns.33  This might be 
characterised as a move away from establishing the business case for responsibility to 
understanding the varying and idiosyncratic business cases for corporate responsibility.  
This position acknowledges that there is no ubiquitous financial justification for 
engaging in CSR strategies and instead, more recent research seeks to unearth those 
factors which explain the existence of win-win situations.34 
 Corporate waste reduction measures are a classic case of both the existence of a 
business case for corporate environmental responsibility, as well as its variability.35  
Waste reduction offers numerous environmental benefits.  It lessens the reliance on 
environmentally harmful disposal techniques and reduces the demand for raw materials, 
thus limiting the environmental damage associated with sourcing and transporting 
virgin materials.36  At the same time, resource efficiency measures such as waste 
reduction are often considered inherently good for business; waste disposal is not free, 
but simply wasting materials is costly in itself.37  Estimates vary, but UK businesses 
could achieve cost savings amounting to billions through waste minimisation.38   
                                                
28 Compare Vogel, above n 8, p xi; Gunningham et al, above n 25, p 69; Allouche and Laroche, above n 13, p 15. 
29 JD Margolis and JP Walsh ‘Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business’ (2003) 48(2) 
Admin Sci Q 268; Margolis and Walsh, above n 12. 
30 Preston and O’Bannon, above n 13; Margolis and Walsh, above n 12, p 16. 
31 Kurucz et al, above n 13; F Reinhardt ‘Market Failure and the Environmental Policies of Firms – Economic 
Rationales for “Beyond Compliance” Behaviour’ (1999) 13 Journal of Industrial Ecology 9; NC Smith ‘Consumers 
as Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Crane et al, above n 1. 
32 Vogel, above n 8, p 33; F Reinhardt ‘Environmental Product Differentiation – Implications for Corporate Strategy’ 
(1998) 40 California Management Review 43; Cowe and Hopkins, above n 13. 
33 See, for example, Cowe and Hopkins, above n 13, p 105. 
34 Smith, above n 31; see also Cowe and Hopkins, above n 13, p 109 suggesting that ‘ … the question is not does 
CSR pay, but when does CSR pay?’ 
35 In view of space constraints, it was not possible to adopt a second case study.  However, many of the conclusions 
drawn from the supermarket waste study will resonate elsewhere, as I outline briefly later in the paper.  It should also 
be noted that waste also exemplifies ways in which a business case for CER may be partly a function of law.  For a 
fuller account, see S Bell and D McGillivray Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2008) 
ch 18. Notably, waste deposited in landfill is subject to a weight-based tax escalator, making diversion from landfill 
more financially attractive than might otherwise be the case. 
36 Science and Technology Committee Waste Reduction (HL 2007-08, 163-I) [3.1]. 
37 Ibid, [6.1]. 
38 Oakdene Hollins The Further Benefits of Business Resource Efficiency (Defra, March 2011). 
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 Regarding supermarket waste specifically, there would appear to be some scope 
for the profitable reduction of waste.39  For example, supermarkets have developed 
sophisticated and efficient systems for stock management, and widely used electronic 
point of sale systems cut down on food waste through improved records and demand 
forecasting.40  An increasingly high-profile (and reputational) concern for supermarkets 
is packaging waste.  In response, product light weighting strategies, particularly the use 
of aluminium and glass, has reduced both the quantity (and hence cost) of material used 
as well as the energy consumed in transport.41  A number of supermarkets have made 
packaging reduction pledges and/or are signatories to relevant ‘voluntary agreements’.42  
Participation in these schemes is justified by reference to a business case, either in the 
form of direct cost savings or the perceived reputational gains flowing from 
participation.43 
 Despite these opportunities, however, research highlights how CSR often fails at 
the first hurdle of simply identifying business case opportunities.  The ability to do so is 
dependent upon, amongst other things, sufficient technical expertise, information, 
management motivation and resources.  This capability is also hindered by bounded 
rationality, where a focus on perceived core business functions misses the scope for 
savings which might be made through environmentally beneficial behaviour.44  The 
difficulty in identifying and implementing such strategies is even more challenging if 
the financial rewards accrue only in the longer term.45  Failures to engage in resource 
efficiency are classic examples of this, and in the area of waste reduction bounded 
rationality remains a problem: ‘the single biggest barrier to waste reduction’ is lack of 
awareness.46  In addition, prejudices regarding the use of certain recycled materials 
persist, despite the existence of quality protocols.47  Legal intervention can also create 
perverse incentives.  For example, the landfill tax is weight-based, making it cheaper to 
landfill lighter materials, in turn lowering the incentive to recycle them. This operates 
against business case strategies such as product light weighting, particularly with the 
use of aluminium, large amounts of which are sent to landfill despite being infinitely 
recyclable.48 
                                                
39 Defra Report of the Food Industry Sustainability Strategy Champions’ Group on Waste (Defra, 2007) p 14.  
Envirowise helped companies and suppliers identify over £12 million of food efficiency savings, see T Stuart Waste 
– Uncovering the Global Food Scandal (London: Penguin Books, 2009) pp 54-5. 
40 Stuart, above n 39, pp 11 and 208. 
41 Science and Technology Committee, above n 36, [3.7].  Product light weighting involves using less material, or 
lighter material substitutes.  
42 The Courtauld Commitments, Phase I (2005-10) and Phase II (2010-12). 
43 See P Jones, D Comfort, D Hillier and O Eastwood ‘Corporate social responsibility: a case study of the UK’s 
leading food retailers’ (2005) 107(6) British Food Journal 423; Science and Technology Committee, above n 36, 
[7.20]. 
44 Science and Technology Committee, above n 36, [6.3]; S Winne and S Standley Business Resource Efficiency 
(AEA Technology Plc, 2009). 
45 See, for example, Gunningham, above n 2, p 218 suggesting that the ‘single largest impediment’ to CER, even in 
the presence of a win-win, is probably a focus on short-term profit. 
46 Science and Technology Committee, above n 36, [6.3]. 
47 Ibid, [4.24]. 
48 Ibid, [4.26]. 
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 These difficulties notwithstanding, clearly there are considerable environmental 
and financial win-win opportunities. Business case efforts such as resource efficiency 
ought, therefore, to be actively encouraged, particularly in view of problems associated 
with bounded rationality.  On a more general level, the rhetoric of the business case has 
also played an important role in placing traditionally ‘non-business’ issues on the 
corporate agenda – environmental and other societal concerns become (more) legitimate 
business issues.49  To this extent, the business case has some appeal.  However, there 
are deeper reasons, beyond uncertainty as to the empirical evidence and the challenges 
involved in encouraging win-win investments, for which one might wish to be 
concerned about the business case claim.  It is to some of these deeper objections that I 
now turn. 
 
 
2. Deeper objections to the business case for corporate environmental 
responsibility 
 
Conjuring and associated dangers 
 The first of these objections is that the rhetoric of the business case, in 
suggesting a generalised positive relationship between corporate environmental 
responsibility and CFP, assumes the ready compatibility of economic and 
environmental concerns.  Even if the empirical evidence points to an overall positive 
relationship, points of conflict between environmental and economic goals do and will 
continue to exist.  For this reason, conjuring imagery is often invoked in critiques of the 
business case.  Doreen McBarnet refers to so-called win-win situations as ‘sleight of 
hand’, masking the scope for conflict.50  For Walley and Whitehead, the business case 
offers illusory ‘rabbit-out-of-the-hat solutions’.51  It is much better that these conflicts, 
where they exist, are acknowledged – there must be a preference for openness in this 
regard.52  As a general body of literature, business case research does not necessarily 
deny the existence of such trade-offs.  However, in taking compatibility as a matter of 
course, there does remain the potential for tensions between corporate prosperity and 
environmental goals to be swept under the carpet.  
 So the concern expressed here is not that environmental and economic concerns 
can never be reconciled.53 Rather, it is the starting point of ready compatibility which is 
                                                
49 On these other societal concerns which receive legitimacy in the corporate sphere by reference to the business case, 
see above n 9, n 10 and n 11. 
50 D McBarnet ‘Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility and the New Accountability’ in T Campbell and S Miller 
(eds) Human Rights and Moral Responsibilities of Corporate and Public Sector Organisations (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
2004). 
51 N Walley and B Whitehead ‘It’s Not Easy Being Green’ (1994) 72(3) Harv Bus Rev 46. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Although some would argue that corporations or certain corporate activities are inherently bad for the environment.  
This type of argument is seen particularly in critiques of sustainable development on the basis of environmental 
limits. See A Dobson Green Political Thought (London: Routledge, 2nd edn, 2000); J Holder and M Lee 
Environmental Protection, Law and Policy (Text and Materials) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 
2007) pp 250-6. 
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problematic, particularly in view of the potential this has to send counterproductive and 
potentially dangerous messages regarding the scale of effort and intervention required to 
ensure environmental protection.  The rhetoric of the business case gives the impression 
that behaving responsibly is easy, and that environmental responsibility is readily 
assimilated within existing business models.  In this sense, the starting point of 
compatibility privileges a business status quo; many identified ‘business cases’, 
particularly resource efficiency, tinker only with existing forms of economic activity to 
make them more environmentally sensitive.54  Much broader questions about the 
fundamentals of a particular industry model (or even its very existence) remain unasked.  
Similar concerns are mirrored in broader CSR literature -- that corporate responsibility 
initiatives serve primarily the corporate interest (they privilege the business status quo) 
and simultaneously legitimise and consolidate, rather than challenge, corporate power 
or damaging but routine business practices.55 There is also the added danger that the 
business case provides scope for corporations to attach misleading or exaggerated CSR 
claims to what may be relatively shallow environmental efforts; the business case may 
permit or encourage ‘greenwash’ activities.56   
 And of course, when there is a conflict between profits and the environment, 
where there is no ‘win-win’, there is no guarantee that the environment will come out 
on top.  Indeed, it is far more likely that the environment will lose out, being unable to 
compete against business imperatives.57 
 
The voice for the environment within the business case 
 The second of these deeper objections relates to how, in business case CSR, the 
value of the environment is expressed via the demands of the market.  Beyond resource 
efficiency measures, environmental and economic win-wins exist because certain 
consumers or investors value environmentally responsible products, services or 
investment opportunities.  However, the environment has no real voice of its own here – 
it is difficult to conceive of the environment as a ‘stakeholder’ in the way we might 
think of shareholders, employees and consumers.  The CSR literature itself has been 
                                                
54 Similar concerns have been levelled against sustainable development (see Dobson, above n 53, pp 62-8).  For an 
argument that sustainable development has been co-opted or hijacked by corporations to promote the business status 
quo (in particular through CSR-type activities geared towards ‘sustainability’) see Banerjee, above n 14, pp 64-7; SL 
Hart ‘Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable World’(1997) 75(1) Harv Bus Rev 6. 
55 See, for example, Banerjee, above n 14, pp 52-9, who refers to this as the ‘emancipatory rhetoric’ of CSR, where 
(as is argued here) such rhetoric is misleading or obfuscatory and, ultimately, dangerous. For a different 
understanding of ‘stakeholder’ rhetoric, see LM Fairfax ‘The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder 
Rhetoric on Corporate Norms’ (2005-6) 31 J Corp L 675.  Fairfax uses an Aristotelian conception of rhetoric which, 
rather than being deceptive or mere double talk, has an inherent ‘truth’ value.  This includes seeing rhetoric as 
‘expressive’, so that the use of stakeholder language by corporations indicates growing public dissatisfaction with 
shareholder primacy. 
56 See, for example, MA Cherry and JF Sneirson ‘Chevron, Greenwashing, and the Myth of “Green Oil Companies”’ 
(November 2, 2011, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1953329); KA Strasser Myths and Realities of Business 
Environmentalism: Good Works, Good Business or Greenwash? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011). 
57 J Corkin ‘Misappropriating citizenship: the limits of corporate social responsibility’ in N Boeger, R Murray and C 
Villiers (eds) Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility – Corporations, Globalisation and the Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) p 43. 
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unclear on this point, at times even marginalising the environment.58  Werther and 
Chandler, for example, view the environment as part of a company’s ‘societal’ group of 
stakeholders, giving rise to a related concern in sustainable development literature that 
poverty alleviation is emphasised to the detriment of environmental protection.59  
Wheeler and Sillanpää outline a hierarchy of stakeholders: primary social, secondary 
social and non-social (including the environment).60  Fundamentally, however, the 
business case expresses the environment indirectly – championed through the voice of 
these other stakeholders, and ultimately through the attribution of financial value.  It is 
questionable whether this allows the environment to compete on its own terms, a 
problem familiar to environmental lawyers of expressing environmental value within 
the market.   
 In essence, the business case turns corporate environmental responsibility and, 
by extension, the environment, into a commodity.61  As such, Hanlon argues that an 
environmental strategy or product is pursued or produced not for the inherent quality it 
has, but because the market values it enough to justify the investment.62  A product or 
policy’s ‘exchange value’—what it can be bought or sold for, what profits it will reap—
is what counts.  Any inherent or ‘use value’ is practically irrelevant.  In a similar 
fashion, the business case values the environment only for its financial worth, not for 
any inherent value there may be in environmental protection.63  Even more 
problematically, this assumes that the value of the environment can be expressed in 
purely monetary or financial terms, even though it is notoriously difficult and indeed, 
controversial, to do so.64  While CSR perhaps represents the opening up of the market to 
a broader range of values,65 it is highly questionable whether the business case can fully 
appreciate them.   
                                                
58 D Ong ‘Locating the “environment” within corporate social responsibility’ in Boeger et al, above n 57. 
59 WB Werther Jr and D Chandler Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility: Stakeholders in a Global Environment 
(California: Sage Publications, 2006); Ong, above n 58. 
60 D Wheeler and M Sillanpää ‘Including the stakeholders: the business case’ (1998) 31(2) Long Range Planning 31. 
61 G Hanlon ‘Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and the Role of the Firm—On the Denial of Politics’ in 
Crane et al, above n 1. 
62 Ibid. 
63 One might prefer to value environmental protection or seek enhanced corporate environmental responsibility for 
reasons other than profit.  A similar argument has been made in the context of increased gender diversity on 
corporate boards, where the business case has become the ‘established narrative’; arguably, however, the case for 
diversity is more appropriately encapsulated in the non-profit values of social justice, equality and non-discrimination 
(see McCann and Wheeler, above n 9, pp 543-4 and 551).  
My concern that any inherent value in environmental protection is lost in business case CSR resonates with Tom 
Campbell’s distinction between ‘instrumental’ and ‘intrinsic’ CSR. Interestingly, Campbell considers the normative 
grounding for instrumental (business case) CSR fairly uncontroversial, in stark contrast to what has been argued here, 
see T Campbell ‘The normative grounding of corporate social responsibility: a human rights approach’ in McBarnet 
et al, above n 2.  Contrast this with JE Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) ch 9, distinguishing between ‘profit-sacrificing’ and ‘non-
profit sacrificing’ (instrumental/business case) CSR, and seeking primarily to justify the former. 
64 See Holder and Lee, above n 53, pp 34-40 and compare D Pearce and EB Barbier Blueprint for a Sustainable 
Economy (London: Earthscan, 2000) pp 2-8 with F Ackerman with L Heinzerling Priceless: On Knowing the Price of 
Everything and the Value of Nothing (New York: The New Press, 2004) p 8. 
65 PR Portney ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic and Public Policy Perspective’ in BL Hay, RN Stavins 
and RHK Vietor (eds) Environmental Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms: Perspectives from Law, 
Economics, and Business (Washington DC: Resources for the Future, 2005). 
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 In response, there is often a preference for political or deliberative engagement; 
such engagement is much more likely than market interactions to reveal true or 
otherwise hidden values.66  Dobson, for example, describes this as the superiority of 
‘ecologically motivated citizens’ over consumers or other ‘economic’ actors in driving 
more sustainable societies.67  The business case for CER is susceptible to similar 
criticism. Relying on the business case to foster CER lends further credibility to the 
economic expression of environment value whilst, according to some, simultaneously 
shifting power away from the (ecological or environmental) citizenry.68  In essence, it 
prefers the market over democratic participation (and by extension, legislative 
intervention). If the business case fails, or in situations where there are no 
corporate/environmental win-wins, environmental legislation provides an important, 
additional layer of protection; and the ecological citizenry potentially has an important 
role in driving this. However, if too much emphasis is placed on the business case, there 
is a danger that these important modes of environmental voice and protection will be 
crowded out.69 
 
Illustration - supermarkets and waste 
 Many examples of the business case rely on the various competitive advantages 
to be gained from environmental product differentiation (‘green’, or rather, ‘greener’ 
products).70  Consumers will pay a premium for an environmentally superior product 
and shareholders will prefer to invest in environmentally responsible companies.  
Concerning consumers and supermarkets, this claim is limited.  If CSR plays any role in 
purchasing patterns, it matters only at the margins; quality and price feature more 
heavily in consumer preferences.71  Indeed, marketing strategies seem to reflect this 
trend.  Within stores at least, there is little evidence that food retailers consistently use 
environmental credentials to promote either products or their own retail brands.72  
However, given the inherent economic and environmental trade-off in retail industries, 
the very nature of a consumer-driven business case is itself logically problematic. 
Environmental degradation is frequently associated with increasing levels of 
consumption, yet retail business models are premised entirely on maintaining (or 
increasing) those levels.  Viewed with this in mind, a consumer-driven business case for 
                                                
66 Holder and Lee, above n 53, p 450. The reasons for demanding public participation and deliberation in 
environmental decision-making are well-rehearsed within environmental law scholarship, in particular that more 
inclusive participation can yield substantively better outcomes. See J Steele ‘Participation and Deliberation in 
Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-solving Approach’ (2001) 21 OJLS 415. 
67 A Dobson Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
68 Corkin, above n 57; Hanlon, above n 61. 
69 This is a general concern with CSR, see, for example, N Gunningham and D Sinclair Leaders & Laggards: Next-
Generation Environmental Regulation (Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 2002) chs 6 and 7, suggesting that CSR type 
activities (such as ‘self-regulation’) are sometimes adopted in the hope of avoiding (more exacting) governmental 
regulation, and Banerjee, above n 14, pp 62-3, arguing that CSR discourses ‘could have the effect of reducing 
governmental scrutiny of corporate practices because they promote a particular form of self-governance.’   
70 Reinhardt, above n 32; M Porter and C van der Linde ‘Green and Competitive: Ending the Stalemate’ (1995) 73(5) 
Harv Bus Rev 120. 
71 Science and Technology Committee, above n 36, [5.15]; Smith, above n 31. 
72 P Jones, D Comfort and D Hillier ‘Marketing and corporate social responsibility within food stores’ (2007) 109(8) 
British Food Journal 582 p 590. 
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CER is somewhat oxymoronic, and the claim that consumers can drive CSR through 
buying patterns downplays the environmental importance of the ‘no-purchase’ option.73   
 Household food waste is an excellent example of this.  It runs directly against 
supermarkets’ business model to encourage consumers to buy less.74  While all the 
major supermarkets have made voluntary pledges to support food waste reduction,75 the 
most prominent ‘CSR’ communication activities as far as consumers are concerned 
centre around ‘value for money’.76  This is often interpreted, however, as more for your 
money–‘Buy One Get One Free’ (BOGOF) and ‘3-for-2’ offers have been repeatedly 
implicated in pushing over-purchasing and, as a result, increasing household food waste 
arisings.77  In addition, food waste within the supply chain is profitable, at least for 
supermarkets.  A combination of factors allow for the financially viable and routine 
over-ordering of stock, in turn driving overproduction levels of between ten and forty 
per cent.78  Such factors include ensuring customers ‘can buy what they want when they 
want’; favourable profit margins for wasting food; and the use of market power to 
contractually shift the costs of food waste up the supply chain.79   This is not to lay 
blame solely on supermarkets.  Individuals must take some responsibility for over-
purchasing and food waste.  However, it is almost trite to acknowledge that altering 
behaviour towards more sustainable outcomes is extremely challenging.80  By implying 
easy solutions, the rhetoric of the business case significantly underestimates the 
challenges in addressing these embedded trade-offs.  And as already indicated, such 
rhetoric hides the inherent conflict between economic and environmental goals in the 
context of consumption.  
 Furthermore, trade-offs exist beyond the economic/environmental.  The business 
case also seems to assume compatibility between environmental, social and corporate 
prosperity goals.  Nonetheless, it is clear these can conflict on many levels.  For 
example, from an environmental perspective, conceiving cheaper food and BOGOF 
offers as an example of corporate responsibility is highly questionable.  When factoring 
in the social perspective, however, the issue increases in complexity.  Environmental or 
ecological goals in themselves can also compete.  For example, the pursuit of business 
case-packaging waste reduction has a number of environmental benefits, in particular 
by using less material and consuming less energy.  However, light-weighting strategies 
to achieve cost-effective waste reduction has its own environmental costs.  The use of 
lighter substitutes, such as laminates and plastics, are not easily recycled in the UK (if at 
                                                
73 M Lee EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-Making (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) p 211 
(and references therein). 
74 Foresight The Future of Food and Farming – Final Project Report (The Government Office for Science, 2011) 
Annex C7; Jones et al, above n 72, p 589 
75 The Courtauld Commitments. 
76 Jones et al, above n 72. 
77 Stuart, above n 39, p 69. Since 2008, there does seem to have been a decline in BOGOF promotions in favour of 
price reduction deals, although 3-for-2 offers persist. 
78 Foresight, above n 74; Defra, above n 39; Stuart, above n 39, pp 24-8, 46-48 and 109. 
79 Ibid. 
80 For example, T Jackson Motivating Sustainable Consumption – A Review of Evidence on Consumer Behaviour and 
Behavioural Change (Sustainable Development Research Network, 2005). 
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all) and so tend to end up in landfill.81  It is unclear whether reduced material and 
energy use is the environmentally preferable outcome. 
 Finally, it is not obvious that the question of how to resolve these various 
tensions and trade-offs is appropriately answered by the economic metrics of the 
business case.  As suggested, political engagement is likely preferable. Indeed, the 
limits of the business case in capturing non-financial, including environmental values, is 
also well exemplified by the challenges associated with food waste.  Misshapen or 
slightly discoloured produce are routinely wasted because they do not comply with 
stringent aesthetic standards imposed by supermarkets.82  Wholesome food is wasted for 
cosmetic blemishes.83  It is unclear whether such attitudes originate with consumers or 
retailers,84 but regardless, discarding perfectly edible food for cosmetic reasons suggests 
that the marketplace neglects food’s inherent value as a source of sustenance.  A 
business case for wasting food indicates the prioritisation of food’s exchange value, and 
the profitable creation of food waste suggests a systemic failure to account for the 
environmental costs associated with both the production and disposal of food.  
 As these brief examples illustrate, there is considerable scope for a number of 
deeply embedded trade-offs, and the effort necessary to move away from these would 
be considerable.  The assumptive starting point of the business case, that environmental 
and economic (and other) goals are readily compatible, is thus problematic.  There are 
also a number of values at stake in corporate activities. The business case is incapable 
of capturing the true significance of these, and as such it is questionable whether the 
business case provides an appropriate channel through which to resolve tensions 
between these often conflicting goals. 
 Whilst supermarket waste makes a useful case study, and acknowledging there 
are well known problems with making generalisations based on a case study 
methodology, we might tentatively explore whether the deeper objections to the 
business case are limited to the supermarket sector or the environmental problem of 
waste.  Waste might for example be considered a ‘special case’ because waste reduction 
is sometimes presented as being inherently good for business (although as has been 
seen, this is not strictly true).  But the idea of a prima facie environmental and economic 
win-win with respect to resource efficiency applies equally to other areas, such as 
energy efficiency (especially in the context of climate change).85  More fundamental 
                                                
81 Laminates are difficult to recycle and plastics such as polyethylene terephthalate (PET), used as a substitute for 
infinitely recyclable glass, cannot be recycled in this country, see Science and Technology Committee, above n 36. 
82 The UK Soil Association estimated that supermarkets reject between 25 and 40 per cent of most British-grown 
crops, although this is partly owing to EU uniformity rules on fruit and vegetables. Nonetheless, supermarkets are 
known to impose stricter requirements than these rules, see Stuart, above n 39, p 108. 
83 Foresight, above n 74. 
84 Ibid; Stuart, above n 39, pp 108-16. 
85 In part because of the perceived environmental business case, energy efficiency has featured heavily in climate 
change mitigation activities, and Government publications frequently invoke similar imperatives when seeking to sell 
the benefits of moving towards a ‘green’ or low-carbon economy; see HM Government Enabling the Transition to a 
Green Economy: Government and business working together (Crown Copyright, 2011) pp 2 and 4-5.  The building 
sector has been singled out as a particularly fruitful area for just such initiatives, with success likely to be hampered 
by energy efficiency ‘behavioural barriers’ similar to those outlined above, see R Dawes ‘Building to improve energy 
efficiency in England and Wales’ (2010) 12(4) Env L Rev 266.  UK businesses across a range of economic sectors 
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similarities between waste and other environmental problems lie in the need for deep, 
challenging and often only hard-won behaviour change.86  A consumer driven business 
case for environmental responsibility is oxymoronic in any consumption sector, not just 
retail grocery, with environmental implications beyond waste management.87  These 
similarities suggest that conflict between environmental and corporate goals will exist in 
other areas, making the business case more generally problematic. Similarly, attaching 
financial value to environmental goods and bads is controversial and difficult, as 
discussed above, regardless of the type of environmental damage. 
 
 
3. Environmentally unenlightened shareholder value 
 
This final Part considers enlightened shareholder value (ESV) in light of these deeper 
objections to the business case for CER.  The aim is not to provide a comprehensive 
legal analysis of ESV.  There are many interesting questions in this regard, but they 
have been addressed extensively elsewhere.88  I outline corporate law issues in broad 
terms and only to the extent necessary to explain the primary concern in this paper; that 
is, how ESV problematically embeds the business case as a mandatory corporate law 
norm, and what this means for section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 from an 
environmental perspective. 
  
Shareholder exclusivity (in brief) and enlightened shareholder value 
 The orthodox position in Anglo-American corporate law is that a company 
should be run for the benefit of its shareholders, what is often referred to as shareholder 
primacy.89  I will use instead the term ‘shareholder exclusivity’, and I do so to denote 
the exclusion of non-shareholding stakeholders (such as employees, creditors, 
customers, the environment, et cetera) from corporate affairs in two broad ways.  First, 
overall shareholder exclusivity as to corporate goal, purpose or objective; the ‘end’ of 
                                                                                                                                          
(subject to certain thresholds and exemptions) now participate in the Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy 
Efficiency Scheme, a mandatory emissions trading scheme made slightly more palatable by estimated savings of 
around £1 billion from reduced energy bills, see J Hopkins ‘The Carbon Reduction Energy Efficiency Scheme: 
overview, rationale and future challenges’ (2010) 12(3) Env L Rev 211 p 213. 
86 See Jackson, above n 80. 
87 See Lee, above n 73. 
88 The literature is too voluminous to cite in full, but see, for example, S Deakin ‘The Coming Transformation of 
Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13 CG 11; M Stallworthy ‘Sustainability, the environment and the role of UK 
corporations’ (2006) ICCLR 155; A Keay ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value, the Reform of the Duties of Company 
Directors and the Corporate Objective’ [2006] LMCLQ 335; A Alcock ‘An accidental change to directors’ duties?’ 
(2009) Co Law 362.  For the general context of ESV, see The Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) 
Modern Company Law For a Competitive Economy - The Strategic Framework (Department of Trade and Industry, 
February 1999), particularly ch 5, pp 33-46 and 48-53. 
89 Sometimes called shareholder value theory or shareholder wealth maximisation.  Both normatively and positively, 
shareholder primacy is controversial, although it does nonetheless represent the orthodox view (see, for example, 
CLRSG, above n 88, pp 34-7).  The academic literature is extensive.  See, for example, SM Bainbridge ‘In Defense 
of the Shareholder Maximisation Norm: A Reply to Professor Green’ (1993) 50 Wash & Lee LRev 1423; LA Stout 
‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 S Cal LRev 1189; P Ireland ‘Property and 
Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory’ (2003) 23 LS 453; A Keay ‘Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Law: 
Can it Survive? Should it Survive?’ (November 1, 2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498065). 
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corporate governance.90  This denotes that a company be run only in the interests of 
shareholders, as opposed to the polar opposite of being run in the interests of 
stakeholders more broadly.  Second, shareholder exclusivity as to corporate ‘voice’, 
comprising important quasi-participatory rights in corporate affairs (via general 
meeting), particularly the powers of board appointment and dismissal, the power to 
make directions and the right to initiate legal proceedings for breaches of directors’ 
duties.91  Shareholder exclusivity should not be confused with exclusivity as to day-to-
day decision-making control, which vests in the board of directors.92   
 In very broad terms, the general position under the Companies Act 2006 is 
shareholder exclusivity as to corporate voice and governance ends, coupled with 
director primacy as to corporate governance means.  The exclusion of non-shareholding 
voices from internal corporate affairs is clear; key governance rights vest solely in 
shareholders to the exclusion of other stakeholders.  This exclusivity is part of a broader 
inside/outside conceptualisation of the company, immediately visible in section 33(1) 
Companies Act 2006, which provides for a mandatory statutory corporate contract 
between only shareholders and the company. The company is a ‘club’, where 
shareholders are within the company, or in the club, and non-shareholding stakeholders 
deal with the company from the outside.93  Section 172(1) Companies Act 2006 
confirms this shareholder-centric corporate goal or end, but provides a slightly broader 
stipulation as to the means by which directors must achieve this.  For the purposes of 
this paper we are concerned specifically with section 172(1)(d): 
 
A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, 
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit 
of its members [shareholders] as a whole, and in doing so have regard 
(amongst other matters) to … the impact of the company’s operations on the 
community and the environment. 
 
Section 172 is at the heart of the legal institution of ESV, and is coupled with a 
narrative reporting obligation in section 417, which requires directors of certain 
companies to compile a ‘business review’ to inform members how they have performed 
these duties.  In the case of quoted companies, this must also provide information about 
environmental matters, including the impact of the company’s business on the 
                                                
90 SM Bainbridge ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97(2) NWULR 547. 
91 For director appointment, see Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), Model Articles (Private Companies), reg 17; Model 
Articles (Public Companies), regs 19 and 20; Worcester Corsetry Ltd v Witting [1936] Ch 640. For director dismissal, 
see CA 2006, s 168; CA 2006, Model Articles, reg 4. For directors’ duties and the enforcement derivatively thereof 
by shareholders, see CA 2006, Pts X and XI. The strength of shareholder voice vis-a-vis the board of directors is of 
course open to debate, but the point made here is that shareholders hold voice to the exclusion of other stakeholders.   
92 It is well established that directors, not shareholders, manage the business, see CA 2006, Model Articles, regs 3-4; 
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; L Sealy and S Worthington Cases 
and Materials in Company Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8th edn, 2008) p 167 and ch 4. 
93 On the idea of the company as a club, see MT Moore ‘Beyond Private Ordering: Towards an “Intelligent Design” 
Theory of Corporate Law Evolution’ (UCL Research Seminar Working Paper, October 2010) and Corporate 
Governance in the Shadow of the State (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) ch 6 (forthcoming).  
 16 
environment.94  The impact of the company’s operations on the environment is just one 
of many ‘stakeholder’ or ‘CSR’ type concerns which directors are explicitly required to 
consider within their decision making process.95  And in view of this (from a CSR 
perspective), there has been a tendency to view ESV with some optimism, in particular 
because it is presented as representing a shift away from shareholder exclusivity.96   
 Arguably, however, this optimism overstates the divergence between ESV and 
shareholder exclusivity.97  As the name suggests, enlightened shareholder value is not a 
challenge to the exclusivity of shareholders as to corporate goal or voice.  There is no 
direct duty owed to those ‘other’ stakeholders, duties are owed to the company,98 and 
directors are to act in a way which promotes the success of the company for the benefit 
of members as a whole.99  Indeed, the Company Law Reform Steering Group (CLRSG) 
stated that ESV maintains the ultimate corporate objective of generating maximum 
value for shareholders.100  At the same time as maintaining this shareholder exclusive 
goal, ESV represents the CLRSG’s belief that directors should adopt an inclusive and 
long-term approach which recognises wider interests of the community and, to the 
extent appropriate, minimises negative impacts of corporate activity.101  The steering 
group argued that there was nothing explicit in company law and directors’ duties which 
mandated a narrower approach.102 However, managerial perceptions of (short-term) 
shareholder demands, together with widespread misunderstandings in the practical 
interpretation of the pre-2006 law, militated against the adoption of the desired and 
more inclusive approach to corporate decision making.103  As such, section 172 in many 
ways aims at legal clarification.   
 This notwithstanding, it is arguable that until section 172, shareholder 
exclusivity as to corporate governance goal was not fully enshrined in law or supported 
                                                
94 For a broad overview, see CA Williams and JM Conley ‘Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious Path of Corporate 
Disclosure Reform in the UK’ (2007) 31(2) William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 317. 
95 CA 2006, ss 172(1)(a)-(f).  
96 For example (and with varying levels of optimism), see Ji Lian Yap ‘Considering the Enlightened Shareholder 
Value Principle’ (2010) Co Law 35; L Roach ‘The Legal Model of the Company and the Company Law Review’ 
(2005) 26 Co Law 98; V Harper Ho ‘“Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide’ (2010) 36(1) J Corp L 59; S Kiarie ‘At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder 
Value and Enlightened Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take?’ (2006) 17(11) ICCLR 
329; CA Williams and JM Conley ‘An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value 
Construct’ (2005) 38 Cornell Int’l LJ 493. 
97 Keay, above n 88; A Keay ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s 
Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’ (2007) 29 Syd LR 577. 
98 CA 2006, s 170. 
99 The meaning of ‘success of the company’ in s 172 is unclear, although ministerial statements suggest this means 
long-term shareholder value, see D Kershaw Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) p 349. 
100 CLRSG, above n 88, p 37 [5.1.12]. 
101 Ibid, p 36 [5.1.8]-[5.1.9] and p 40 [5.1.19]. 
102 Ibid, p 40 [5.1.19]. 
103 Ibid, p 36 [5.1.10] and pp 39-41 [5.1.17], [5.1.20]-[5.1.22]. 
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consistently by case law.104  And on this view, section 172 provides new strength to 
shareholder exclusivity by way of an ‘unambiguous statement in legislation’.105 
 
The business case as a procedural legal norm 
 In essence, section 172(1)(d) mandates, institutes and embeds the business case 
for corporate environmental responsibility as a procedural norm.  Directors must ‘have 
regard’ to environmental impacts, but only insofar as this contributes to the overall 
corporate goal of promoting the success of the company for the benefit of shareholders.  
The environment is valued instrumentally, not because it has any inherent or intrinsic 
value.106  As such, section 172 does not sanction profit-sacrificing behaviour motivated 
by environmental concerns, so that ESV in turn does not provide a direct means by 
which to address negative environmental externalities.107  Indeed, the damage 
recognised under section 172 is not ‘environmental’ damage, but damage to the success 
of the company, and this is likely to be measured in purely financial terms (possibly by 
reference to share price depreciation).108  Ultimately, therefore, ESV’s instrumentalality 
results in the attribution of (corporate) financial worth to environmental value. 
 Furthermore, there remains no real voice for the environment within ESV.  
While the language surrounding section 172 talks of ‘inclusivity’,109 the exclusivity of 
shareholder voice is preserved.  This includes the important right to initiate legal 
proceedings for a breach of section 172, so that there is no cause of action for ‘corporate 
environmental wrongs’ exercisable on behalf of the environment by the world at 
large.110  In any case, given environmental damage is not recognised, any benefit to the 
environment that might be gained from pursuing an action for breach of section 
172(1)(d) will ultimately be incidental.111  Fundamentally, as with the business case, the 
                                                
104 Keay, above n 88; Deakin, above n 88; D Attenborough ‘How Directors Should Act When Owing Duties to the 
Company’s Shareholders: Why We Need to Stop Applying Greenhalgh’ (2009) 20(10) ICCLR 339. 
105 A Keay ‘Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Enlightened Shareholder Value, Constituency Statutes and More: 
Much Ado About Little?’ (2011) 22(1) EBLR 1 p 41. 
106 Keay, above n 105, p 29 points also to the reform background, in particular the rejection of what was termed a 
‘pluralist’ approach, which would see stakeholder concerns as ‘ends in themselves’. The pluralist approach maps  
what is more generally understood as stakeholder theory (often attributed to RE Freeman Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman/Ballinger, 1984)).  However, there is disagreement as to whether this requires 
stakeholders to be treated as ends in themselves, or merely as means to a (corporate) end (albeit perhaps in a firm 
with a corporate objective pertaining to the creation of value for all corporate constituents, not just shareholders); see, 
for example, JP Walsh ‘Book review essay: taking stock of stakeholder management’ (2005) 30(2) Academy of 
Management Review 426; Freeman, above n 106, p 97. This resonates with the distinction between inherent and 
instrumental CSR (see Campbell, above n 63). 
107 Keay, above n 105, pp 40-41 and Keay, above n 97, p 592. 
108 A potential ‘environmental’ breach of s 172 is the share price, revenue and reputational costs arising from a failure 
to implement adequate environmental protection measures (Keay, above n 105, p 29; see also Kershaw, above n 99 
on the meaning of ‘success of the company’ and the hypothetical application of s 172 to the BP oil disaster in the 
Gulf of Mexico by R Alexander ‘BP: Protection of the Environment is Now to be Taken Seriously in Company Law’ 
(2010) Co Law 271). Stallworthy, above n 88, p 159, suggests that the duty-emphasis on shareholder interests is 
representative of a reluctance in private law generally to accommodate values beyond a raw and narrow economic 
individualism. 
109 CLRSG, above n 88, ch 5 generally. 
110 The cause of action vests in the corporation, also enforceable derivatively by shareholders (see above n 91). 
111 In essence, this is a problem of using ‘private’ law instrumentally for environmental purposes.  This will be 
familiar to environmental lawyers, particularly concerning private nuisance.  See, for example, J Steele ‘Private Law 
and the Environment: Nuisance in Context’ (1995) 17 LS 236. 
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environment remains dependant upon indirect financial expression via market advocates 
(primarily shareholders, but also customers).112  No deliberative space is provided to 
allow for the non-economic expression of environmental concerns within corporate 
decision-making, and section 172 does not provide legitimacy for CER undertaken on 
the basis of an inherent value in doing so.113 
 Nonetheless, Mark Stallworthy, for example, welcomes section 172, arguing 
that the admission of ideas other than profitability discussed within company processes 
is ‘from an environmental perspective, obviously attractive’.114  He points, in particular, 
to the familiarity of procedural tools of regulation in environmental law, as well as the 
dictation of processes without a substantive environmental standard.115  However, while 
procedural requirements in the absence of a substantive standard are relatively common 
in environmental law, the goal or norm to which the process is geared is normally 
‘environmental’ in some way. The process is imposed because, in theory, it can yield 
substantively better environmental outcomes.  This is lacking in section 172.  The 
process is not geared towards an environmental outcome, since there is no alteration to 
shareholder exclusivity as to corporate goal.116  Indeed, the lack of a deliberative space 
for the appreciation of environmental value brings into stark question the optimism that 
mere proceduralisation will yield substantially better environmental outcomes.  And 
given profit sacrificing behaviour is not permitted and that, therefore, profitable 
(regulatory compliant) environmental degradation is sanctioned, ESV seems actually 
rather indifferent to substantive environmental outcomes.   
 The incidental substantive environmental benefits envisaged under ESV indicate 
the problematic assumption underpinning the relationship between process and 
substance in section 172; namely, that the two are somehow mutually supportive.  In the 
language of the business case critique presented herein, this assumes the compatibility 
of environmental goals and corporate prosperity. But as has already been suggested, this 
is the wrong starting point; it hides the scope for environmental and economic trade-offs 
and, more worryingly, sends a potentially dangerous and misleading message regarding 
the scale of effort necessary to ensure environmental protection.117  Despite this, support 
                                                
112 ESV clearly prioritises investors as the voice for corporate environmental responsibility, though of course 
business cases arise from other economic actors, including customers and environmental NGOs.  However, with 
business case CER and instrumentalism in ESV, even the advocacy of NGOs (who might be expected to express the 
value of the environment in non-economic terms) boils down to impacts on the financial bottom line.  See Harper Ho, 
above n 95, pp 101-6, arguing that many stakeholders in ESV are ‘indirect and imperfect substitutes for direct 
participation’. 
113 See also C Villiers, ‘Directors’ duties and the company’s internal structures under the UK Companies Act 2006: 
obstacles for sustainable development’ (2011) 8 ICCLJ 47. 
114 Stallworthy, above n 88, p 165. 
115 Environment Assessment is the most obvious example of this. 
116 C Parker ‘Meta-regulation: legal accountability for corporate social responsibility’ in McBarnet et al, above n 2, 
argues that process-oriented CSR interventions must be accompanied by a norm or value (not necessarily a standard) 
to yield positive outcomes. 
117 The institution of ESV is not necessarily a denial that environmental and shareholder interests may never diverge, 
but rather that any manifestations of this mismatch (negative environmental externalities) ought to be addressed not 
through company law, but by environmental regulation (see, for example, Lord Goldsmith during  Parliamentary 
debates, HL Deb 6 February 2006, vol 678, col GC271 and SF Copp ‘S. 172 of the Companies Act 2006 Fails People 
and Planet?’ (2010) Co Law 406).  Nonetheless, by embedding the business case as a procedural norm, s 172 adopts 
this problematic starting point of ready compatibility.  
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advanced for ESV tends to be achieved by appealing to this type of problematic 
business case sleight of hand which collapses the divide between the interests of the 
environment (or society) and shareholders.118   
 To clarify, this is not as an argument against procedural approaches generally, 
but rather that section 172 represents only in a limited way proceduralisation as is 
typically understood by environmental lawyers.  And of course, this should all be 
accompanied by acknowledging the well-rehearsed limitations of information-based 
regulation in the environmental context,119 especially given the purpose of the business 
review is to provide a section 172 compliance report for shareholders, not 
environmental information, or broader CSR disclosure, to stakeholders generally.120  
Most importantly, however, we ought to question whether silence may have been 
preferable to buying, legislatively, into the rhetoric of ready environmental and 
economic compatibility and embedding within corporate law a shallow, instrumental 
appreciation of environmental value.121 
 If corporate law does insist on referencing the environment, then it must move 
beyond the non-conflictual rhetoric of business cases and purely instrumental 
environmental value.  In view of this, an environmental variant of section 309 of the 
Companies Act 1985122 might have been preferable to its successor, section 172. 
Section 309 required directors to have regard to the company’s employees as well as the 
interests of shareholders.  The phrasing is significant here, given that there is at least a 
semantic equality between employees and shareholders, and certainly not the 
immediately noticeable subordinate or instrumental value afforded to stakeholders 
under section 172.123  An environmental variant of this duty would potentially allow 
limited space for the expression of intrinsic environmental value by permitting some 
                                                
118 See, for example, Harper Ho, above n 96, pp 80-83; Kiarie, above n 96; S Deakin ‘Squaring the Circle? 
Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK’ (2002) 70 Geo Wash LRev 976. 
119 See, for example, F Ost ‘A Game Without Rules? The Ecological Self-Organisation of Firms’ in G Teubner, L 
Farmer and D Murphy (eds) Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of 
Ecological Self-Organization (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1994).  
120 CA 2006, s 417(2); see also C Villiers Corporate Reporting and Company Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) and IH-Y Chiu ‘The paradigms of mandatory non-financial disclosure: a conceptual analysis: 
Parts 1 and 2’ (2006) Co Law 259 and 291 on the distinction between shareholder (or ‘non-CSR’) and stakeholder-
centric reporting. 
121 Debate as to whether s 172 intended to codify or alter the previous common law position (see, for example, 
Alcock, above n 88, p 368) is irrelevant to the point I make here, which is that ESV is now mandatory and backed by 
an unambiguous legislative statement. 
122 Previously Companies Act 1980, s 46. 
123 There was debate as to the precise effect of s 309.  Some suggested that since section 309 gave ‘no indication’ that 
the interests of employees and shareholders were to be weighted differently, directors were thus required to balance 
the interests of employees with those of shareholders.  Others, in rejecting any notion of balancing, pointed out that s 
309 did not affect the ‘interests of the company’, which continued to be defined by reference to shareholders (see 
Parkinson, above n 63, pp 82-5, quoting AJ Boyle (ed) Gore-Browne on Companies (Bristol: Jordans, 44th edn, 
1986)).  
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environmentally motivated profit sacrificing behaviour,124 whilst simultaneously 
avoiding the problematic business case sleight of hand embodied in ESV.125   
 Given that the enforcement problems associated with section 309 led to the 
general conclusion that it was ‘next to useless’, an environmental variant of this duty 
would be far from a solution to the challenges of properly incorporating environmental 
concerns within corporate law.126  Nonetheless, by eschewing the problematic business 
case rhetoric and instrumental environmental value of ESV, an environmental version 
of section 309 would arguably have been a step in the right direction for some of the 
reasons why section 172 arguably is not. 
 
Unenlightened shareholders 
 Under ESV, the shareholder is now conceptualised as being ‘enlightened’ as to 
how their own self-interest might be furthered.  This shareholder is said to appreciate 
how a focus on short-term financial gain, coupled with a disregard for the type of 
stakeholder concerns listed in section 172(1), will be ‘incompatible’ with corporate 
success in the long term.127  In essence, shareholders are re-understood as being aware 
of the business case for CSR, and under section 172(1)(d), the business case for 
corporate environmental responsibility specifically.   
 One might want to question the understanding of this shareholder as being 
somehow now ‘enlightened’.  The value of the environment to this shareholder is that of 
instrumental wealth generation, of only a purely financial appreciation of natural or 
environmental resources, and one who accepts wealth generation in spite of continued 
environmental degradation as a direct result.  Such a shareholder buys in to an 
assumptive starting point of economic and environmental compatibility, and hence is 
generally, and uncritically, accepting of the corporate status quo.  This shareholder is 
also mirrored in contemporary approaches to socially responsible investment (SRI) 
initiatives, the justification for which also tends to rest on a business case and thus 
similarly buys into an instrumental appreciation of environmental value.128  While the 
                                                
124 This would be a defence for directors in that they would be permitted to have regard to the environment other than 
instrumentally for shareholder wealth generation.  Given the limited enforcement routes (discussed further, below n 
126), this would be a ‘shield’ for director decision making rather than a ‘sword’ for potential litigators. 
125 As noted by Parkinson, above n 63, p 82, there is ‘inevitably’ conflict between the interests of employees and 
shareholders, so that the duty to have regard to employees is not necessarily harmonious with, or instrumental to, 
shareholder wealth generation. Win-win rhetoric, therefore, did not underpin s 309. 
126 S 309 was described as a lame duck provision (see A Keay ‘Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: an 
interpretation and assessment’ (2007) Co Law 106 p 109; B Pettet ‘Duties in Respect of Employees under the 
Companies Act 1980’ (1981) 34 CLP 199 pp 200-4).  As with s 172, the s 309 duty was owed to the company, so that 
in turn any wrong was against, and the cause of action vested in, the company (on s 172 enforcement, see above n 
91).  Employees therefore had no remedy under the provision.  LS Sealy ‘Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities - 
Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural’ (1987) 13 Mon LR 164 p 177, described s 309 as ‘either one of the 
most incompetent or one of the most cynical pieces of drafting on record’, since central to its perceived failings was 
the unusual statutory language of ‘to have regard’ comprising a duty which was owed not to the intended 
beneficiaries of the obligation but rather to the company.  
127 CLRSG, above n 88, [5.1.12]. See also CA 2006, s 172(1)(a), requiring directors to have regard to the likely 
consequences of any decision in the long term.  
128 See, for example, BJ Richardson and W Cragg ‘Being Virtuous and Prosperous: SRI’s Conflicting Goals’ (2010) 
92 Journal of Business Ethics 21. 
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long-term perspective is an important element of ESV,129 it adds little to the 
enlightenment of our section 172 shareholder. The mismatch between the environmental 
and corporate meaning of the ‘long term’ is potentially considerable, and in reality, 
massive, given companies struggle to think much beyond an annual timeframe, even in 
the presence of section 172.130 
 There has been an acknowledgement in some corporate law scholarship that the 
conception of the shareholder as uniformly concerned with profit generation is 
increasingly out of step with reality.131  Instead, ‘real’ shareholder interests are linked to 
both economic and non-economic goals, such that if an individual derives non-financial 
benefits from socially and morally desirable corporate activities, maximising 
shareholder value is not the same as maximising shareholder profit.132  Such 
shareholders might be considered enlightened, but they are not representative of the 
shareholder envisioned under section 172.133  This shareholder remains environmentally 
unenlightened.134 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
When viewed in terms of profits, environmental protection is potentially a more 
credible corporate concern than would otherwise be the case.  As such, the business 
case might be seen as playing an important role in legitimising CER. Furthermore, 
despite the empirical uncertainty as to a generalised business case, considerable 
opportunities for environmental and financial win-wins exist.  Barriers remain, in 
particular regarding awareness, but encouraging businesses to seek profitable ways in 
which to reduce their environmental impact would seem a sensible strategy.   
 However, there are good reasons to operate extreme caution in the reliance we 
place on the business case.  As a generalised claim, the business case assumes the easy 
compatibility of environmental protection and corporate goals.  As has been argued, 
rhetoric to this effect is potentially unhelpful. A classic type of win-win, resource 
efficiency, is an excellent example of the way in which business case strategies may 
involve only relatively minor changes to the fundamentals of an environmentally 
                                                
129 See above n 127.  
130 And much more likely a perspective of between three and six months, see O Aiyegbayo and C Villiers ‘The 
enhanced business review: has it made corporate governance more effective?’ (2011) JBL 699 p 722. One of the 
respondents to the study outlined in Gunningham et al, above n 25, p 63 referred to this as the ‘tyranny of quarterly 
returns’, such that long-term benefits can be ‘substantially discounted or ignored.’ 
131 See, for example, DJH Greenwood ‘Fictional Shareholders: “For Whom is the Corporation Managed,” Revisited’ 
(1996) 69 S Cal LRev 1021 and L Stout The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms 
Investors, Corporations, and the Public (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2012). 
132 E Elhauge ‘Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest’ (2005) 80(3) NYUL Rev 733. 
133 And indeed, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that the attitudes of investors (generally, as well as after 
the institution of ESV) do not correspond with more exacting notions of ‘responsible investment’, see Aiyegbayo and 
Villiers, above n 130. 
134 See also Villiers, above n 113, arguing that enlightened shareholder value, despite first appearances, is not really 
compatible with (stronger or more transformative) versions of sustainable development, although this argument is 
more focussed on gender diversity at board level than with environmental concerns. 
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degrading but nonetheless deeply embedded business status quo.  Broader or deeper 
structural and institutional changes are difficult to contemplate within the business case.  
In addition, the instrumental and purely economic value afforded to environmental 
protection is problematic, not least because it places reliance on market rather than 
political impetus for enhanced responsibility.    
 In view of the declaratory value of legislation, instituting the business case as a 
mandatory corporate law norm seems problematic.  Nonetheless, through section 172, 
corporate law legislatively endorses a purely financial and instrumental value to 
environmental protection, underpinned by rhetoric to the effect that environmental and 
economic goals walk hand in hand.  That shareholders who conceive of the environment 
in such a manner are ‘enlightened’ is questionable, especially when such shareholders 
accept the generation of wealth in spite of continued environmental degradation as a 
direct result.  Rather than mandating a corporate purpose defined by reference to these 
unenlightened shareholders, it might have been better for corporate law to simply 
remain silent as to the environment, at least until willing to move beyond the non-
conflictual rhetoric of business cases and purely instrumental environmental value. 
